By Sunday Dare
Nigeria’s 2027 presidential contest is already generating the kind of political commentary that often substitutes certainty for evidence. Some commentators have elevated opposition figures into political inevitabilities, while others have written off the incumbent administration as a failure before the full consequences of its economic reforms can be properly assessed.
Steve Osuji’s recent intervention falls into the former category. His assessment of the emerging presidential landscape presents Peter Obi as an almost inevitable political force and depicts President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration in overwhelmingly negative terms.
But political forecasting is not the same as political analysis.
The 2027 election will ultimately be determined by voters, electoral arithmetic, party structures, candidate credibility and, crucially, the state of the Nigerian economy. It cannot be settled by commentary, social-media enthusiasm or predictions presented as political fact.
The more useful question, therefore, is not whether one commentator prefers Obi, Tinubu or another candidate. It is whether the arguments being advanced about Nigeria’s political future withstand scrutiny.
The Peter Obi Question and the Arithmetic of 2023
A central element of Osuji’s argument is the portrayal of Peter Obi as the candidate who effectively won the 2023 presidential election but was denied victory by an allegedly flawed electoral process.
That remains a deeply contested political claim, not an established electoral fact.
The official result declared Bola Tinubu the winner, with Atiku Abubakar second and Obi third. Whatever one’s assessment of the conduct of the election, political analysis must distinguish between an alternative interpretation of the result and the legally declared outcome.
Nigeria’s presidential elections are also governed by constitutional requirements extending beyond simply obtaining the largest number of votes. A successful candidate must satisfy the prescribed national-spread requirements, making the geographical distribution of support an important part of the electoral equation.
Obi demonstrated significant political momentum in parts of the country, particularly in the South-East and among younger, urban and digitally engaged voters. His performance also demonstrated the disruptive potential of a third-party presidential campaign.
But converting that momentum into a national presidential victory requires more than enthusiasm in selected constituencies. It requires a sufficiently broad coalition across Nigeria’s highly diverse political, ethnic, religious and geographical landscape.
That is the arithmetic every 2027 contender must confront.
Populism Is Not a Substitute for Organisation
The growing appeal of digital politics has changed the way Nigerian politicians communicate with voters. Social media can mobilise millions of supporters, amplify messages and challenge established political structures.
But presidential elections are still won through a combination of votes, organisation, coalition-building and credible nationwide structures.
A political movement that relies heavily on online mobilisation must eventually translate that enthusiasm into polling-unit organisation, voter mobilisation and electoral resilience across all geopolitical zones.
The question facing Obi and other opposition aspirants is therefore not whether they command passionate supporters. They clearly do.
The harder question is whether that support can be converted into a sufficiently broad national coalition capable of winning a presidential election under Nigeria’s constitutional and electoral framework.
The same scrutiny should apply to every candidate.
Donald Duke, Omoyele Sowore, Adewole Adebayo and other aspirants should not be dismissed merely because they compete outside the dominant political camps. A healthy democracy requires political pluralism and voters should be free to evaluate competing programmes.
Ultimately, however, every candidate will have to answer the same question: what is the credible plan for fixing Nigeria’s structural economic problems?
Tinubu’s Reform Record Requires a Fuller Assessment
Osuji’s description of the Tinubu administration as an “abysmal failure” presents one side of a much more complicated economic story.
The administration inherited an economy burdened by fiscal pressures, fuel subsidies, foreign-exchange distortions, weak government revenues, infrastructure deficits and a difficult debt-service burden.
That does not absolve the government of responsibility for subsequent economic outcomes. But it does provide essential context for assessing the reforms undertaken since May 2023.
The most consequential decisions were the removal of the petrol subsidy and the overhaul of the foreign-exchange regime.
Both measures imposed significant short-term costs on households and businesses. Petrol prices rose sharply, transportation costs increased and inflation accelerated. The naira also underwent a major adjustment.
Those consequences cannot be wished away.
But neither can the structural distortions that the reforms were intended to address.
For years, governments struggled with the political cost of reforming fuel subsidies and the multiple-exchange-rate system. Successive administrations repeatedly deferred difficult decisions because of their immediate political consequences.
Tinubu chose a different path.
Whether the reforms ultimately deliver their promised benefits will depend on implementation, inflation management, productivity growth and the government’s ability to protect vulnerable households. But judging the policy solely by its immediate pain ignores its intended structural purpose.
Fiscal Reforms Have Changed Government Finances
The removal of the fuel subsidy fundamentally altered the government’s fiscal position.
The Federal Government no longer bears the same scale of direct subsidy burden that characterised the previous regime, while revenues distributed to the three tiers of government have increased significantly.
Higher allocations, however, do not automatically translate into better governance.
The real test is whether additional public resources are converted into productive infrastructure, better healthcare, improved education, stronger security and a more competitive business environment.
This is where the Tinubu administration will ultimately be judged.
Nigeria’s Growth Story Is Still Unfinished
Nigeria’s economy has continued to grow, although the pace and quality of that growth remain central concerns.
The economy recorded real GDP growth of 4.43 per cent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026, according to the figures cited by the administration.
The more important question, however, is whether headline GDP growth is translating into stronger household incomes, lower inflation, more jobs and improved productivity.
GDP growth alone cannot determine the success of an economic reform programme.
The same applies to foreign-exchange stability and external reserves.
Nigeria’s external reserves have strengthened substantially, while the gap between official and parallel exchange rates has narrowed considerably. These developments are important because a more transparent FX market reduces opportunities for arbitrage and provides businesses with greater certainty.
But exchange-rate stability must ultimately be accompanied by stronger domestic production and export capacity.
Otherwise, Nigeria risks achieving temporary financial stability without the structural transformation required for sustained prosperity.
Infrastructure Is the Next Big Test
The administration has also placed infrastructure at the centre of its development strategy, including projects such as the Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway and the Sokoto-Badagry Highway, alongside investments in rail, power and other strategic infrastructure.
Public-private partnerships and new infrastructure financing mechanisms could help reduce the pressure on government budgets.
But infrastructure projects should not be judged simply by their size or publicity.
The critical measures are value for money, completion, economic returns, transparency and the extent to which they reduce the cost of doing business.
A road that lowers logistics costs, a railway that moves freight efficiently or a power project that enables factories to operate reliably can produce economic returns far beyond the initial public expenditure.
That is the standard against which the administration’s infrastructure programme should be evaluated.
Social Protection Must Keep Pace With Reform
The strongest criticism of the government’s economic programme remains the pressure it has placed on ordinary Nigerians.
Inflation has eroded household purchasing power, while food, transportation, housing and energy costs remain major concerns.
The government’s social interventions therefore matter.
The Nigerian Education Loan Fund, Credicorp initiatives, support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and the implementation of a new national minimum wage are among the measures designed to cushion the impact of adjustment.
But social intervention cannot become a substitute for economic growth.
The durable solution to poverty is an economy capable of creating productive employment, raising real incomes and expanding opportunities for millions of Nigerians.
Security and Institutional Reform
Security remains another major determinant of Nigeria’s economic prospects.
Insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and communal violence have imposed enormous economic and social costs on the country.
The government has intensified military operations against armed groups, but the ultimate measure of success will be whether communities become safer, agricultural production recovers and economic activity expands in previously insecure areas.
The same principle applies to anti-corruption institutions.
Strengthening agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission is important, but institutional credibility depends on consistent enforcement, due process and the perception that the law applies equally to all.
A Working Vacation Is Not a Governance Failure
Osuji’s criticism of President Tinubu’s working vacation is another example of political symbolism being elevated above substantive governance.
A president’s temporary absence from Abuja does not, by itself, establish administrative failure.
Modern government operates through institutions, ministers, civil servants, technology and established executive procedures. Presidents routinely conduct diplomatic, economic and strategic engagements outside their countries and official bases.
The appropriate question is therefore not where the president is physically located, but whether government institutions continue to function and whether policy decisions are being implemented effectively.
Political criticism should focus on outcomes rather than optics.
2027 Will Be a Referendum on Results
The most important point about the 2027 presidential election is that it will not be decided by newspaper columns, political predictions or social-media campaigns.
It will be decided by Nigerian voters.
By then, voters will have had a clearer opportunity to judge whether the Tinubu administration’s reforms produced tangible improvements in their lives.
They will ask whether inflation has fallen, whether the naira is more stable, whether jobs have increased, whether electricity supply has improved, whether roads and railways are working, whether businesses can obtain foreign exchange, whether security has improved and whether government revenues are being used more effectively.
The opposition will face equally demanding questions.
Can it present a credible economic alternative? Can it build a genuinely national coalition? Can it reconcile its promises with Nigeria’s fiscal realities? Can it demonstrate that it has the organisational capacity to govern a complex federation?
These are harder questions than simply declaring one candidate a messiah and another a failure.
Substance Must Outlast Political Prophecy
Nigeria cannot afford a 2027 election dominated exclusively by personalities, nostalgia, anger or political mythology.
The country needs a contest over ideas, economic policy and measurable results.
Peter Obi’s political movement deserves serious scrutiny because it represents a significant constituency and has altered the dynamics of opposition politics. Tinubu’s administration likewise deserves rigorous scrutiny because it has undertaken some of the country’s most consequential economic reforms in decades.
Neither should be immune from criticism.
But neither should be judged through partisan caricature.
The ultimate test of the Tinubu administration will be whether today’s painful reforms produce tomorrow’s stronger economy. The ultimate test of the opposition will be whether it can offer a credible alternative capable of delivering better outcomes without reversing necessary reforms or ignoring fiscal realities.
That is the debate Nigeria needs ahead of 2027.
The electorate will have the final word.
Dare (PhD) is Special Adviser to the President on Media and Public Communications.
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